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Profit-maximizing land developers are hypothesized to configure subdivisions to 
minimize the effects of a conservation regulation on developed land values, subject to their 
expectations about the demand for developed building lots.  This hypothesis allows 
development of a hedonic price model that takes account of production adjustments.  The 
model is applied to the Maryland Forest Conservation Act, which requires developers to 
retain or plant trees on part of the developed land.  Being exempt from the Act allows 
developers to gain more for the subdivisions they develop: the cost to regulated developers is 
about six percent of the per-acre price of developed land.  The Act has significantly lowered 
per-acre developed land values in subdivisions with a mixture of townhouses and single-
family dwellings.  Costs of the Act are reduced by provisions that allow developers to plant 
trees offsite or to pay fees in lieu of planting. 
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Introduction 
 
Most metropolitan areas of the United States have local regulations that control the 
development of suburban land.  These regulations work in conjunction with other 
government programs, the land market and an area’s natural geography to determine the 
suburban landscape.  They typically are implemented through county or municipal planning 
agencies that have the power to withhold approval, validate compliance with existing laws, 
administer fees, and negotiate changes in subdivision development plans.  Some regulations, 
such as an agricultural zoning restriction that limits residential development to one house per 
twenty acres, work primarily to affect the timing and density of development.  Others, 
including clustering regulations and floodplain building requirements, serve primarily to 
determine the configuration of subdivisions once their development is initiated. 
  The Maryland State government put a regulation of this second type into place in 
1991 when they enacted the Forest Conservation Act (FCA).  This Act, the first of its type in 
the United States, requires subdivision developers to leave or plant forest on a certain 
proportion of the land being developed.  As Hilsenrath et al. (7) note, “The primary objective 
of the Act is to ensure that as much forest as possible is retained during the land development 
process.  If forest clearing is unavoidable, the Act requires reforestation at mandated ratios.  
On sites with limited or no forest resources, new forest stands (afforestation) must be 
established at minimum levels.” (p. 1).  Enforcement of this Act is placed with local 
government planning agencies, which determine required reforestation and afforestation 
levels.  Planting or retention requirements depend on land use (zoning) categories, but can be 
adjusted through wide ranges (e.g. 15 to 50 percent).  They also can be affected by agency 
desires to maintain forest in environmentally sensitive areas, in areas that adjoin forest on   3
other properties, along wildlife corridors, next to streams, etc.  While local authorities are 
granted discretion in administering the Act, developers also are granted discretion in 
compliance, for they may meet the regulation by planting or retaining forest on-site, planting 
off-site, or by paying a fee in lieu of compliance. 
This paper presents a hedonic price analysis developed to determine how developed 
land values are being affected by this novel and flexible regulation.  Such an analysis should 
be timely, as concern about “sprawl” and desire for “smart growth” is increasing interest in 
the provision of forested area and other open space within the suburban landscape.  It may 
also contribute to the hedonic property value literature (reviewed by Palmquist in Braden and 
Kolstad, (13) and by Freeman (4)).  This literature currently is being extended to allow for 
exogenous (to the homebuyer) changes in the supply of open space over time (Smith et al. 
(15); Irwin and Bockstael (9)).  But, as is also true for the more traditional property value 
studies (see, in particular, Tyrväinen and Miettinen (16)), these analyses are concerned with 
the demand for open space and forest that is located outside of a developed building lot.  We 
are concerned with the supply of open space that is retained or provided within a property 
that is being developed.   
We have not found any previous hedonic studies that analyze how regulations affect 
the way a subdivision is produced.  Some previous conceptual work exists that treats the land 
developer as a producer (Büttler (1); Colwell and Scheu (2)).  Holway and Burby (8) use a 
production model of land development to derive a hedonic derived demand equation for an 
undeveloped parcel.  But they do not investigate how developed land values are affected by 
production controls.  Consequently, we introduce a theoretical model in the paper’s next 
section that can be used to analyze the Forest Conservation Act.   4
While the theory includes both the decision of when to develop (the optimal timing 
decision) and how to develop (the production decision), the empirical analysis is confined to 
the production decision.  Separation from the timing decision is accomplished by the way 
data are obtained: we determine a universe of properties that have been developed into 
residential subdivisions in a given time period and a given region, and then draw a 
representative sample from that universe.  The separation depends on a revealed timing 
argument.  If sufficient information exists, and if rational owners develop property when it is 
most profitable to do so, then seeing a tract develop at time t reveals that t is the optimal time 
to develop.   Thus our data is drawn from the set of properties for which t has arrived. 
The next section reviews and slightly extends part of a theoretical model developed 
by Fujita (5).  The section following that describes the formulation of the hedonic model.  It 
introduces the data we assembled and reviews how we formulated the models used in the 
empirical analysis.  Results obtained from the estimated models are presented in the 
subsequent section.  Findings about the effects of the Forest Conservation Act on subdivision 
values are emphasized, but this section also reports other results obtained from the model.  
The final section summarizes the study and presents its main conclusions.   
Conceptual Framework 
 
Pogodinski and Sass (14, p. 598) report in their 1991 survey that “By far the most 
common way to analyze the effect of zoning regulations is to estimate a hedonic housing 
price model.”  The model we develop is formulated for the price of a subdivision instead of a 
house.  Development of a subdivision is defined as the process of converting a rural property 
into a set of building lots and parcels.  Parcels are composed of open space, streets, parking 
areas, swimming pools, playing fields and other land units without houses.  Homebuyers do   5
not directly purchase parcels, but their presence affects the value that buyers are willing to 
pay for building lots. 
Since a subdivision is a set of lots and parcels of different sizes and values, averaging 
or indexing is required to obtain a single price.  In our data, we aggregate values for each 
building lot and parcel into an average price per acre for the subdivision.  If subdivisions 
were homogeneous goods, returns to scale could be analyzed by observing how this average 
price varies for subdivisions of different sizes.  But subdivisions of the same size may have 
different configurations and exhibit different prices.   For this reason, we define the 
subdivision price as a hedonic price function, which for any given size of subdivision, may 
vary according to the composition and attributes of lots and parcels. 
Our subdivision price model is a modification of a specification Fujita developed as 
part of his urban growth model.
1  Fujita makes lot size endogenous, a necessary feature to 
describe a situation where developers can choose to develop lots for single family, 
townhouse or multiple family housing units.  We extend Fujita’s model to incorporate parcels 
without houses, as well as heterogeneous land attributes.  For simplicity, the following 
discussion is restricted to the case of a single size of building lot and a single parcel size.  
Multiple lot and parcel sizes can be incorporated into the model, but doing so adds 
complexity without insight. 
Adoption of an existing model implies adoption of a preexisting set of assumptions 
and conditions.  The adopted formulation models timing of development as a single switch in 
land use.  Rents derived from agricultural use are obtained continuously until the date of 
development, development is instantaneous, and housing rents are obtained continuously 
                                                 
1 The urban growth model has been developed by Anas, Arnott, Breuckner, Capozza and Helsley, Fujita, Mills, 
Wheaton and other economists.  For a review of urban growth theory, see Fujita (6).     6
thereafter.  Housing does not depreciate and is not replaced over time, and uncertainty and 
risk are set aside by assuming that the developer can perfectly anticipate future housing rents. 
Given this conceptual framework, the price of an acre of land can be specified as: 
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where 
m = distance in miles from the subdivision to a central business district (CBD) 
s = size of the building lot expressed in acres 
p = size of the parcel expressed in acres 
t = date of development 
h= vector of mutable characteristics including capital improvements 
z = vector of immutable characteristics including flood plain, topography, etc. 
r = discount rate for future revenues and costs 
and 
A = rental value of an acre of undeveloped land at time τ and at distance m from  
  a central business district 
R = rent of a developed lot of size s at distance m in time τ with improvements h 
  in a subdivision with a parcel of size p and immutable characteristics z 
C
s = costs of developing a building lot of size s at time t in a subdivision with 
 improvements h and immutable characteristics z 
C
p = costs of developing a parcel of size p at time t in a subdivision with 
 improvements  h and immutable characteristics z.   7
This price is the net present value of an acre of the subdivision discounted to time 0, 
with development occurring at time t ≥ 0.  Developed land rents depend on the size of the lot, 
the size of the parcel, and other mutable characteristics (e.g., houses, walking paths, etc.) 
supplied by the developer.
2  Rents also vary with distance from a CBD, with time, and with a 
vector z of immutable characteristics (e.g., presence of streams and wetlands).  The parcel 
receives no direct rent payments, but the consumer’s willingness to pay for a developed lot is 
affected by the presence, size and characteristics of the parcel.  Rents are assumed to increase 
with p, making the parcel a desired characteristic of the subdivision.  The developer is 
assumed to take rents accruing to undeveloped land as exogenous.  This is consistent with a 
situation in which the developer does not control management of the land prior to time t. 
For equation (1) to be a hedonic price model, developers must maximize v by 
choosing optimal values of t, s, p, and h for any distance m, undeveloped land rent A(τ; m, z), 
and characteristics z.  The rent R(s, p, t, h; m, z) must be the consumers’ maximum 
willingness to pay or “bid rent” for a developed lot at time t and distance m, with lot size s 
and housing characteristics h in a subdivision with parcel p and characteristics z.
3  When this 
type of bid rent function exists and is included in equation (1), then v(m, s, p ,t, h; z) is a 
function both of the costs of supplying the developed lots and parcels and of the consumers’ 
willingness to pay for them.  Incorporation of the bid rent in v adds the rational expectations 
hypothesis that the developer knows and uses the consumers’ demand for developed lots in 
                                                 
2 Model (1) is based on the assumption that the developer supplies both subdivision infrastructure and housing 
units.  This simplification ignores the fact that many subdivision developers sell building lots to homeowners 
who build custom houses or to commercial firms that construct houses and then sell the house and lot to 
homebuyers.  Developers and builders will be treated as separate entities in our empirical model. 
3 Derivations of this type of bid rent from homebuyer utility maximization models are available in Fujita, or in 
Wheaton (18).   8
his or her production decisions.
4  Under these conditions, the value v can be interpreted as an 
equilibrium price and the hedonic model can be estimated using observed market data.  
The equilibrium condition inherent in equation (1) is most easily seen by noting that 
the price of a building lot  
∫
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t
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is modeled as the present value of the stream of future rents obtained from the developed use.  
If bid rents rise faster than agricultural rents over time, the optimal time to develop and to sell 
a building lot is when the bid rent has increased enough to cover the opportunity costs and 
direct costs of development.  At that date:   
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Thus the model incorporates the competitive equilibrium condition that the value added by 
development just equals the cost of developing it.
5 
                                                 
4 Rational expectations are a bit of a misnomer here.  While actual lots have to be developed before they are 
sold and the developer has to employ an expected price function, development is instantaneous in the model.  In 
it, the expected price would be the sales price and the developer would observe the price function.   
5 Condition (2) is a first order condition that translates the costs of development to a per-lot basis.  If, for 
example, a subdivision is one acre in size and is configured to have two ¼ acre building lots and a ½ acre 
parcel, then s = ¼ and p/s = ½.  One fourth of the foregone undeveloped land rent A, all of the cost of the capital 
needed to develop a lot, and one-half of the cost of the capital needed to develop the parcel are included as costs 
of development.  The requirement that developed lot rents rise at a faster rate over time than agricultural land 
rents is a second order condition (Fujita (5)).     
   9
The conditional model we are using in our empirical analysis can be obtained by 
setting t = 0 in equation (1).  Then the per-acre price of the subdivision becomes: 
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An interior solution to the problem of maximizing v, with s, p and h all greater than zero, 
would satisfy the following conditions: 
For lot size 
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t r  is the average future rent from the 
developed lot, and  x R  is the partial derivative of that rent with respect to x = s, p, and i.
6 
Conditions (4) and (5) establish the optimum size of lot and parcel.  They can be 
pictured as net return curves in a two-dimensional mapping of value against size.  If the 
average net return defined by the left side of the optimization condition (5) is smooth, 
continuous and convex, and has a positive unique maximum at a positive p, then the marginal 
net return defined by the right side of the condition will be equal to the average at that 
optimum size.  A zoning condition such as the Forest Conservation Act may force the 
                                                 
6 These optimization conditions also apply to model (1) if t replaces 0 as the lower limit of integration.   10
developer to provide a larger than optimum-sized parcel.  This will cause this optimization 
condition to be violated: marginal net returns will be less than average net returns at the 
imposed p, and the equality in condition (5) will become a “greater than” inequality.  
Average net returns will be lower than those obtained at an optimum-sized parcel, and 
because these net returns appear in the subdivision price equation (1), v will be decreased by 
the imposition of the exogenous parcel size constraint.  Thus, in an empirical model with 
subdivision price as a dependent variable, a negative and significant coefficient on a variable 
measuring parcel size would be consistent with the presence of a regulation that makes parcel 
size “too big” and lowers the value of a subdivision development.
7 
Conditions (6) are the first order conditions for mutable attributes.  They state that the 
optimum amount of attribute to produce equates the marginal cost of providing the attribute 
to the marginal increase in rent obtained from it.  We follow Palmquist (12) in putting 
mutable characteristics into the hedonic function, and consequently take a similar risk that 
mutable attribute quantities will be simultaneously determined with subdivision price.  This 
will not happen if the developer treats the marginal increase in rent as parametric when 
satisfying condition (6).  Palmquist develops a rationale for interpreting marginal rents in this 
way.  The heuristic argument in our case is that the developer actually uses an expected bid 
rent function since the lot is developed before it is sold.  When the market is in equilibrium, 
only homebuyers willing to pay  ) , ; , , ( z m h t s Ri will be in the market.  Successful developers 
will use this marginal market bid rent function to develop the lot: in equilibrium developers 
who do not do so will not be in the market.  Thus the assumption that R in equation (1) is an 
                                                 
7 An analogous argument applies to the optimum lot size condition (4).  A negative estimated coefficient would 
be expected for a lot size variable if a local jurisdiction imposes a binding minimum lot zoning regulation on a 
developer.  To develop this argument more formally, one could add constraints to equation (1) and obtain an   11
equilibrium rent function allows mutable attributes to be incorporated into the hedonic 
model.  Condition (3) serves to verify that this can be an internally consistent assumption for 
the model. 
Hedonic Analysis 
Our empirical study is restricted to subdivisions that have all single-family dwellings, 
all townhouses, or mixtures of single family and townhouse dwellings.  Subdivisions with 
commercial or industrial sites or with lots developed for apartment buildings are eliminated 
from the study: we did not want to include cases where price could depend on the value of 
lots not developed for homeownership.  We also have limited the study to subdivisions with 
five or more building lots and to subdivisions for which plans were approved between 1991 
and 1997. 
  Data for the analysis were collected from county planning agencies and from State-
maintained GIS databases.  The initial work, done in the counties, identified all of the 
subdivisions that fit our residential use criteria.  Then a random sample of data was collected 
from each county planning agency for at least 40 percent of these qualifying subdivisions.  
These data were matched to lots and parcels in the Maryland Property View county databases 
developed and maintained by the Maryland State Department of Planning.  The Property 
View dataset provided access to tax assessment, sales and “CAMA” data files (which contain 
attributes of existing dwelling units), and to GIS data on roads, streams, and other 
geographical features. 
  The study area is made up of five Maryland counties in the DC-Baltimore 
metropolitan area.  Two, Montgomery and Prince Georges, have densely populated urban 
                                                                                                                                                       
expanded set of optimization conditions.  Then the difference between the average and marginal values would 
be the sum of the shadow prices associated with the constraints.   12
areas that adjoin Washington D.C.  The average commuting distance from the sample 
subdivisions in these counties to the Washington D.C. CBD is 16.3 miles.  Subdivisions in 
Carroll and Charles, the most rural counties included in the study, are dispersed throughout 
the countryside or clustered around a county town center.  The average commute from these 
subdivisions to the nearest major CBD is 45.2 miles.  The average commute to the center of 
Baltimore (the nearest CBD) from the sample subdivisions in Howard County is 15.8 miles.  
But this fifth county has many homeowners who work in and commute to the Washington 
D.C. metropolitan area.  Howard is one of the fastest growing counties in the State, and its 
location between two metropolitan areas adds to the spectrum of subdivision development 
situations included in the analysis. 
Data 
The hedonic model is formulated to predict the average per-acre assessed land value 
of the subdivisions.  This variable (ACRLNDVL) is calculated by first dividing the assessed 
values for each lot and parcel in a subdivision by the acreage of that lot or parcel.  The 
resulting per-acre values are then averaged over the lots and parcels within the subdivision.  
Since parcels are included in this average, the effect of leaving open space and providing 
amenities in the subdivision is in the computation.  So also are the effects of variation in 
floodplain and other natural features of the subdivided property.  Table 1 provides descriptive 
statistics for the available observations for this variable and for the other variables described 
below. 
Assessed value is used instead of sales value because the output of the developer is 
defined to be developed lots and parcels.  In many cases in our data, the lot is developed but 
not yet sold.  Thus considerable adjustment of the recorded sales data would be necessary to   13
create comparable sales values for the sample lots.  Assessors in all five counties are 
mandated to provide full market value assessments of both lots and improvements, and we 
proceed under the assumption that their lot assessments will be a more accurate proxy of 
relative sales value than our adjustments.  Assessed values are available for all lots and 
parcels: thus suitable subdivision values can be computed.  Assessments used in the analysis 
occurred in 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000, and we use dummy variables (ASSESSD__) to 
adjust for any systematic change over time in these values. 
Subdivision developers will configure subdivisions to fit the type of housing they 
expect to be built, and a variable measuring the value of building improvements is needed to 
explain this aspect of land development.  Among the variables listed in Table 1 is an 
instrument for the value of housing, BLDINSTR, which is a proxy for the developer’s 
estimate of how much revenue the planned set of houses will produce when they are sold.  
We observe higher lot values for lots of similar size when housing values are higher, and if 
the quality of house placed on a lot affects the lot’s assessed value, then differences in 
observed house sales prices or assessed values of improvements will be correlated with the 
hedonic model’s error term.  The instrument is developed to eliminate this correlation. 
BLDINSTR is constructed by dividing a predicted value for improvements on each 
building lot by the acreage in the lot and then averaging these per-acre values for each 
subdivision.  Predicted values are obtained from a random effects panel model.  Coefficients 
for the panel model coefficients were estimated using the 6,000 plus building lot observations 
for which CAMA data are available.  Variables included in the panel model measure the 
square feet of the houses’ foundation, the quality of construction, and the exterior material 
(brick, vinyl siding).  The model also includes variables that measure the number of stories,   14
the type of house (townhouse, split level), the year built, and the presence or absence of a 
public sewer hookup.  Model fit is good, with 92 percent of the total variation in the 
assessments of improvements explained.  BLDINSTR cannot be constructed for eleven 
subdivisions that have no CAMA data and for 27 subdivisions that have no houses built in 
them.  Because this variable represents developer expectations about housing values, these 
observations are dropped when the hedonic model parameters are estimated.  
Lot size is a fundamental element in the configuration of subdivisions, and the 
average acreage of building lots is included in the subdivision dataset.  This lot acreage is 
conditional on the type of housing being developed:  townhouses will have small lots relative 
to the square footage of the house foundation and the deviation in the size of lot provided 
with a given townhouse will be small.  Bigger lots will be provided with single-family 
detached dwellings and there will be a greater range of lot sizes for a given size of house.  To 
recognize these design differences, and to allow for dwelling unit zoning restrictions that 
control the type of housing that can be supplied, we develop dummy variables indicating 
subdivisions approved to have all townhouses (TYPE1), all single-family dwellings 
(TYPE2), and a mixture of townhouse and single-family dwellings (TYPE3).  We then create 
three lot size measures (LOTSIZE1, LOTSIZE2, and LOTSIZE3) by multiplying the average 
of the building lot acreages in each subdivision by these dummy variables.  These variables 
are our empirical measures for s, the size of building lot variable included in the conceptual 
model. 
All five counties include minimum lot sizes as part of their zoning codes.  But not all 
of the sample subdivisions are constrained by this restriction: 141 of the 261 sample 
subdivision developments have minimum lot sizes that are smaller than the zoning code   15
minimum and 13 have minimum lot sizes that are larger.  To model this situation, we subtract 
the zoning code minimum from the observed minimum lot size (LOTMIN – MINLOT) and 
then create two variables.  LOTEXCPN takes the value of this difference when the observed 
values are lower than the code values and takes a zero value otherwise.  LOTZONE takes the 
value of this difference when the observed minimum lot size is larger than the code size and 
takes a zero otherwise.  Thus by construction, both variables take zero values when 
subdivisions have minimum lot sizes that satisfy the zoning code restrictions (107 cases).  
Inclusion of these minimum lot variables in a hedonic model will produce an estimate of the 
value of being able to produce lots smaller than the code size and an estimate of the value 
gained from providing minimum lots that are larger than the minimum zoning size.  These 
estimated values will be relative to the value of subdivisions for which the lot size constraint 
is satisfied, since the effect of the zoning code will be subsumed into the model’s intercept.
 8 
Parcel size (defined as p in the conceptual model) is represented in the data by 
PCTOPEN, the percentage of total acreage that is designated as open space parcels in the 
subdivision plans.  Designated or planned open space omits area devoted to streets, parking 
lots and similar land uses.  While these areas are necessary to the production of developed 
lots, they are not necessarily viewed as amenities by homebuyers.  To allow for the 
possibility that provision of open space is dependent on the type of subdivision, PCTOPEN is 
multiplied by TYPE1, TYPE2 and TYPE3.  This creates the variables PCTOPN1, PCTOPN2 
and PCTOPN3.  
                                                 
8 We assume that an observed minimum lot size that deviates from code by one tenth of an acre or less meets 
the zoning regulation.  This allows for measurement error and for the likelihood that county planning agencies 
tolerate some small topographically driven deviations from code specifications.  Changing this deviation to 0.05 
acre causes less than a one percent change in the hedonic model estimates.      16
Variables measuring other subdivision characteristics under the control of the 
developer include AMENITY1 – AMENITY4, dummy variables that indicate the presence or 
absence of constructed amenities such as walking paths, pools or golf courses.  Mutable 
characteristics also are measured by lot configuration variables giving the percentage of 
building lots that adjoin floodplain (PCTFLDLT), forest (PCTFORLT), open space 
(PCTONPLT), water bodies other than storm water management ponds (PCTWATLT), and 
storm water management ponds (PCTSWMLT). These type-of-lot variables are obtained by 
counts from maps, and they do not account for any tradeoff in value between large lots that 
contain forest and open space within lot boundaries and smaller lots that are located next to 
areas that do not have houses. 
Several variables are developed to measure differences in buyer bid rents caused by 
factors outside of the control of the developer.  Among these are a measure of commuting 
distance to the nearest CBD (CMMILE) and measures of the quality of the schools serving 
the subdivision (MSPAP_E and MSPAP_H).  Characteristics of the countryside surrounding 
the subdivision are represented by OPENURBN (area in public parks, outdoor recreation 
facilities, historic sites, etc), NATURAL (area in brush, forest, wet or bare land) and 
FARMLAND (area in agricultural use).  These variables are computed as percentages of land 
in the designated uses within a one-mile radius of the subdivision center.  All three can 
represent amenity values to homebuyers.  NATURAL and FARMLAND can also proxy for 
the costs of buying land for development.  In this role, these variables can indicate the supply 
of nearby land potentially available for development.
9 
                                                 
9 They are not an exact indicator because farm and natural land that is preserved will not be available for 
development.   17
Geographic factors that affect how the developer can configure the subdivision are 
measured by VTAREA, the total acreage of the property under development, PCTWET, the 
percentage of total acreage that is floodplain or wetland, and PCTTREE, the percentage of 
total acreage that is in forest before development.  Since size of subdivision is exogenous in 
this conditional analysis, omission of VTAREA would impose a constant-returns-to-scale 
assumption on the production of developed lots and associated amenities.  Acreage that is in 
designated floodplain or wetland cannot be used for building lots; thus its presence increases 
the area configured as parcels and reduces the area available for the production of building 
lots.  Acreage in forest can either be cleared and developed or kept in open space parcels.  
This developer choice is introduced by PCTKEPT, which measures the percentage of 
forested land that is retained after the subdivision is developed. 
   We do not have a “clean” before-after comparison of the Forest Conservation Act’s 
effect.  We would have liked to provide such a measure, but the GIS data available to us for 
the analysis begins in 1993 and the while the Act was initiated in 1991.  But we do have data 
that captures effects of the Act.  Trees planted to satisfy the Forest Conservation Act may be 
placed on open space or floodplain parcels or on open areas within large building lots.  
Developers of subdivisions with enough area in these parcels or building lots can plant 
onsite.  Developers of subdivisions without such suitable areas will have to plant offsite or to 
pay fees in lieu of planting. Variables measuring the effects of the Act include the percentage 
of the subdivision site required to be planted to forest (PLANT), the percentage developers 
choose to plant onsite (PLANTON), to plant offsite (PLANTOFF), and a dummy variable 
(TREEFEE) that indicates if a fee was paid in lieu of planting.  We also construct a variable 
(OFFPLANT) by converting the fees to equivalent acreages, adding these acreages to those   18
planted offsite, and then converting the result into a percentage of site measure.  Subdivisions 
exempt from the Forest Conservation Act are indicated by the dummy variable EXEMPT. 
 Models 
  Initial exploration of hedonic price models using linear and semi-log specifications 
showed parameter estimates to be dependent on functional form.  Accordingly, we adopted a 
Box-Cox form that includes both of these specifications as special cases.  The Box-Cox 
transformation of the model’s dependent variable is ACRLNDVL
(λ) = (ACRLNDVL
λ – 1) / 
λ.  We tested whether this Box-Cox transformation produced significantly different estimates 
by fitting models in which λ is restricted to 0.0 (the semi-log model) or to 1.0 (the linear 
model).  Likelihood ratio tests support the hypothesis that the Box-Cox specification is 
significantly different from the linear and semi-log formulations.  Consequently only Box-
Cox model results are reported here. 
  We also used Box-Cox transformations to test if the subdivision size and commuting 
distance variables should be nonlinear variables.  We found that substituting LOGAREA = 
log(VTAREA) and LOGMILE = log(CMMILE) for VTAREA and CMMILE in the Box-
Cox model resulted in virtually the same parameter estimates as a model with Box-Cox 
transformations for VTAREA and CMMILE.  Results presented in this paper are from Box-
Cox models with LOGAREA and LOGMILE included as explanatory variables.
10 
   The other explanatory variables chosen to be in the estimated models are listed in the 
first column of Table 2.  This table presents results from two alternative models: one that 
does not distinguish whether trees are planted onsite or offsite and one that does.  Both of the 
estimated models reported in Table 2 were tested for the presence of spatial autocorrelation 
                                                 
10 Cropper, Deck and McConnell (3) found a linear Box-Cox model to be a preferable form in a simulation of 
housing prices in the Baltimore region.  We do not know if their findings extend to developed lot prices.   19
using Moran and Lagrange multiplier tests and a variety of distance measures.  None of the 
test statistics were larger than the critical values at any of the usual confidence levels, and we 
consequently did not attempt to adjust the models for spatial autocorrelation. 
Model 1 is formulated to test the hypothesis that the Forest Conservation Act does not 
have different effects on the price of different types of subdivisions.  We estimated two 
variants of this model.  One includes the variables PLANT1, PLANT2 and PLANT3, which 
are formed by multiplying PLANT by TYPE1, TYPE2 and TYPE3.  The other variant 
replaces PLANT1 and PLANT2 with PLANTH, which is the sum of PLANT1 and PLANT2.   
The first variant allows the effects of the tree planting requirements to differ between 
townhouse, single-family and mixed dwelling unit subdivisions.  The second allows these 
planting requirement effects to differ between subdivisions with homogeneous types of 
housing and “planned unit subdivisions” (PUD’s).  The second distinction is relevant because 
subdivisions with all townhouses or all single-family dwellings are subject to a more 
abbreviated planning and approval process than are PUD’s.  Table 2 presents the second 
variant, but these tabled parameter estimates for the significant coefficients differ by 4 
percent or less from those of the first variant. 
Model 2 is developed to test the hypothesis that developers comply with the Act in 
the same way when they produce different types of subdivisions.  To test this, PLANTH is 
decomposed into PLANTONH, the acreage of trees planted onsite in the townhouse and 
single-family subdivisions, and OFFPLNTH, the equivalent acreage planted offsite.  
PLANT3 is decomposed into PLANTON3 and OFFPLNT3.  As in the case of model 1, both 
variants were estimated, and as in the case of Model 1, similar results were obtained.   20
  We have modified the first variant of Model 1 to test the hypothesis that counties 
administer the Forest Conservation Act similarly.  That was done by multiplying PLANT by 
the dummy variables CARROLL, CHARLES, HOWARD, MONTGMRY and PRINCGEO, 
incorporating these five interaction terms into the model and omitting PLANTH to avoid 
singularity.  None of the parameters estimated for the added variables were significantly 
different from zero, and model fit was not affected by the modification.  Nor were the 
estimated parameters for other variables substantially different.  Based on this evidence, we 
accepted the hypothesis that the counties were administering the Act similarly and adopted 
the models presented in Table 2.  
Results 
Forest Conservation Act 
  The 45 subdivisions that are exempt from the Forest Conservation Act have 
significantly higher per-acre developed land values than the 216 subdivisions that are 
regulated.  This difference is estimated to be $13,200 per acre using the coefficient from 
Model 1 and $13,300 per acre using the coefficient from Model 2.  It amounts to 
approximately 5.5 percent of the $242,000 per acre average value of the developed land.  
Exempt subdivisions include subdivisions with application dates that precede implementation 
of the Act and subdivisions that qualified for exemption because of provisions within the 
Act.  Thus we can only conclude that, regardless of reason, having an exemption allows 
developers to gain a modestly higher per-acre price for the subdivisions they develop. 
  Model 1 is formulated to measure the effect of the Forest Conservation Act on the 
values of different types of subdivisions.  Results from this model (see the estimated 
coefficient for PLANTH) indicate that, once other factors are controlled, the Act is not   21
lowering the average per-acre value of homogeneous dwelling (single family and townhouse) 
subdivisions beyond the general effect of being subject to the regulation.  But the significant 
coefficient on PLANT3 indicates that implementation of the Act is having an additional 
negative effect on the price of “type 3” subdivisions.  These subdivisions contain both single-
family and townhouse dwellings and, as the estimated coefficient for LOTSIZE3 indicates, 
they obtain a higher per-acre value from having more flexibility to determine lot sizes. 
The magnitude of these effects can be seen by comparing elasticities.  Seventeen of 
the subdivisions in the random sample are mixed-dwelling nonexempt subdivisions (TYPE3 
=1 and EXEMPT = 0).  For these subdivisions, Model 1 provides an estimated mean 
elasticity of -0.092 for the change in per-acre subdivision price that would result from a one 
percent change in the acreage required to be planted by the FCA.  The corresponding 
elasticity of per-acre subdivision price for a one percent increase in average lot size is 0.083.  
Thus a marginal increase in the acreage required to be planted to trees would decrease the 
average per-acre price of $561,800 for these 17 subdivisions by an estimated $51,700.  A 
small increase in the size of lots provided would raise that average price by $46,600.  These 
results suggest that while per-acre values of type 3 subdivisions are higher, they could be 
increased by supplying less forested area and larger lots.    
  On average, developers of the type 3 subdivisions have been required to plant 
approximately 10.8 percent of their total site acreage into trees, about the same as the 9.3 
percent average required to be planted in the homogeneous dwelling unit (type1 and type2) 
subdivisions.  Three developers have been able to retain enough forested acreage to avoid 
having to plant any trees.  Five have had to plant between 20 to 29 percent of the acreage 
being developed.  When compared to the other nonexempt subdivisions in the sample, the   22
type 3 developments are located closer to an urban center (16 miles versus 24 miles), are 
surrounded by about the same amount of residential development (41% versus 37%) and are 
generally larger in size (66 acres versus 42 acres).  Average lot size is small when compared 
to the single-family dwelling subdivisions (0.15 acre versus 1.22 acres) due to the townhouse 
dwellings in these subdivisions.  Sixty-five percent of the type 3 developments include 
walking paths and tot lots as compared to 14% of the homogeneous unit subdivisions, and 35 
percent provide ball fields, swimming pools or tennis courts as compared to 3% of the type1 
and type2 subdivisions.  Thus these developers may have more competing uses for the un-
built parcels retained in the subdivision and that may help explain why the forest regulation 
has a greater effect on their value. 
  Model 1 imposes the same estimated coefficient on acreage that is planted on or off 
of the subdivision site.  Model 2 introduces the developer’s decision to plant onsite or offsite.  
This is done by replacing PLANTH and PLANT3 with corresponding PLANTON and 
OFFPLANT variables.  Acreage equivalents paid for by fees in lieu of planting are 
incorporated into the offsite variables so that all of the acreage required by the Act is 
included.  Exclusion of these acreage equivalents results in insignificant coefficients for all 
offsite variables. 
Model 2 reveals that developers of type3 subdivisions are significantly affected by the 
Forest Conservation Act regardless of whether they plant trees onsite or offsite.  Sample 
summary statistics indicate that, on average, developers of these subdivisions supply about 
7.6 of the 10.8 percent acreage requirement onsite and about 3.2 percent offsite.  The mean 
elasticity of price with respect to a change in the percentage of acres planted onsite is -0.053 
and the elasticity of price with respect to a change in the percentage planted offsite is -0.038.    23
These elasticity estimates indicate that the choice to plant onsite or offsite has lowered the 
cost to the developers: a marginal increase in planted acreage would decrease subdivision 
price by an average $27,300 instead of the $51,700 indicated by Model 1.  Thus the 
opportunity to plant either onsite or offsite is reducing the costs of compliance to the Forest 
Conservation Act.   
  Developers of seventeen of the 216 nonexempt subdivisions chose to pay a fee in lieu 
of planting trees.  The estimated coefficients for TREEFEE in models 1 and 2 indicate that 
this choice increased the per-acre price of these subdivisions by $40,300 (Model 1) and 
$50,600 (Model 2).  We could not detect anything in the data that would suggest why these 
developers chose to pay fees instead of planting trees offsite.  When compared to 
subdivisions for which trees were planted offsite, the subdivisions for which fees were paid 
contain similar-sized lots (0.52 versus 0.68 acres) and have roughly similar per-acre prices 
($364,700 versus $319,150).  They have a greater percentage of their area in planned open 
space (29% versus 17%), but more of them provide walking paths and tot lots (41% versus 
20%).  It may be that these subdivisions provide a different type of open space amenity, or it 
may simply be that the cost of planting and ensuring survival of new trees is higher for these 
developers. 
Other Results 
Figure 1 shows how commuting distance affects the predicted subdivision price once 
other model factors are held constant.  This gradient is obtained from Model 1 and is based 
on an average per-acre subdivision price of $242,000, the approximate mean for the sample 
of 261 subdivisions.  As the figure shows, this average price occurs at about 23 miles of 
commuting distance, which is beyond the steeply declining part of the gradient.  For close-in   24
subdivisions, the price change per mile is greater than the change in the costs of commuting.  
Thus the gradient should not be interpreted as a cost of transportation function. 
The estimated coefficients for LOGAREA in Table 2 indicate that the per-acre price 
of larger subdivisions is lower than the price of smaller subdivisions.  Signs and significance 
have been stable enough across alternate models that we believe that this basic negative 
relationship exists.  But collinearity between LOGAREA and FARMLAND is strong enough 
that we are not willing to use the coefficient estimates to quantify this relationship.   Omitting 
LOGAREA from model 2, for example, alters the coefficient estimates on FARMLAND by 
26% and omitting FARMLAND alters the estimates for LOGAREA by 66%.  With this sort 
of variation, it is imprudent to estimate elasticities or to say how much lower or higher will 
be the subdivision price.  The estimated coefficients for FARMLAND do remain negative 
and significant, regardless of whether LOGAREA is included or omitted from the model.  
Thus the models do indicate that a lower subdivision price is associated with an increased 
supply of farmland in the vicinity of the development.
11  
  As expected, the sign and significance of BLDINSTR indicates subdivision prices are 
higher when house values are higher.  The estimated coefficients for LOTSIZE2 indicate that 
per-acre prices are approximately $19,000 less for subdivisions with no townhouses.  This 
also is expected, since the per-acre costs of producing single family dwellings are smaller.  
Less expected is the finding that subdivisions with minimum lot sizes that match zoning code 
regulations have similar per-acre prices to subdivisions with minimum lot sizes that are less 
than zoning code specifications.  Higher values would be expected for subdivisions with 
                                                 
11 .  Using data from the same general study region, Irwin (10) found that surrounding farmland increased land 
values relative to residential development, but that the effect became insignificant when the vicinity was 
increased from a 0.06 mile radius around each parcel to about 0.4 mile.  Our observations are defined   25
smaller than code lots if minimum lot size is a binding constraint on the production of 
developed lots.  Insignificant price differences may be consistent with the hypothesis that 
zoning “follows the market” (McMillan and McDonald (11); Wallace (17)).  But exemptions 
from codes may also play a role, since the average minimum lot size for the 141 subdivisions 
with sizes less than code is 0.6 acres, substantially less than the average zoning code 
restriction of 3.3 acres.  There is a market for the transfer of development rights in three of 
the five sample counties, but only a few of the developers of the 141 subdivisions 
participated in this market. 
Per-acre prices are predicted to be higher for the thirteen subdivisions where 
developers are observed to provide larger than prescribed minimum lot sizes.  Models 1 and 
2 provide similar mean elasticity estimates of approximately 0.32 for these subdivisions.  
This translates into a marginal price increase of about $26,000 for subdivisions that have an 
average assessed value of $81,400 per acre.  These are large-lot subdivisions, with an 
average lot size of 3.3 acres. 
  Table 2 indicates that school qualities, as measured by MSPAP_E and MSPAP_H, 
are related to subdivision prices.  When other factors affecting subdivision value (including 
MSPAP_H) are held constant, predicted prices for subdivisions with MSPAP_E scores of 14 
(the lowest observed score) are approximately equal to the average per-acre price of 
$208,000.  But predicted prices are approximately $68,000 higher than this average for 
subdivisions with MSPAP_E scores of 81 (the highest observed score).  When MSPAP_E is 
held constant at its mean, subdivisions with the highest observed MSPAP_H score of 106 
have predicted prices that are about $42,000 higher than the average $242,000 price, and 
                                                                                                                                                       
differently from Irwin’s (whose data consists of residential parcels with houses that sold between 1995 and 
1999), and we are concerned with the supply of lots rather than the demand for houses.   26
subdivisions with MSPAP_H scores of 90 (the lowest observed score) have predicted prices 
that are about $78,000 lower.  These estimates suggest that counties can reasonably expect 
some of the costs of providing better schools to be offset by consequent higher property tax 
revenues. 
We were mildly surprised to find that PCTWET and PCTTREE do not significantly 
affect the predicted subdivision price, since we thought these variables would represent 
natural constraints on the production of subdivisions.  It may be that the timing of 
development adjusts for observable natural features, and that development is delayed or 
moved forward until prices are in equilibrium.  We know that PCTKEPT is correlated with 
PCTTREE; nevertheless, omitting either of these variables does not make the other’s 
estimated coefficient significant.  Apparently developers can successfully adjust for 
differences in initial site conditions, and also determine the right amount of forest to retain. 
  The models indicate that subdivision values would increase if developers would 
produce a greater amount of open space in townhouse subdivisions.  Signs of the estimated 
coefficients for PCTOPN1 are important because they suggest that the planning agencies are 
not forcing these developers to supply more open space than would be demanded by 
homebuyers.  If that were so, we would expect a lower subdivision value and a negative sign.  
Developers appear to be making the right trade-offs between open space parcels and building 
lot size in single-family and mixed-dwelling type subdivisions, since the estimated 
coefficients for PCTOPN2 and PCTOPN3 are insignificant.  This is an interesting outcome, 
for the data indicate substantial heterogeneity in the configuration of single-family 
subdivisions.  The sample of type 2 subdivisions can be decomposed into 90 single-family 
subdivisions with less than one percent open space and an average lot size of 2.06 acres, and   27
126 single-family subdivisions with an average 33.1 percent open space and an average lot 
size of 0.77 acre. Yet estimated coefficients remain insignificant when PCTOPN2 is 
decomposed into two variables, one representing the 90 subdivisions and the other 
representing the 126.  This suggests that developers are producing the right amounts of large-
lot-no-open-space and smaller-lot-open-space single-family subdivision configurations.   
  Per-acre subdivision prices are found to be higher if the developer provides walking 
paths, tot lots, or sitting areas (AMENITY1) or ball fields, tennis courts or swimming pools 
(AMENITY3).  Positive coefficients make sense for these variables, since these constructed 
amenities are costly to provide.  In equilibrium, the increase in subdivision price, net of 
differences due to other characteristics, should just cover the costs of constructing these 
amenities.  Except for subdivisions with lots adjoining water bodies (PCTWATLT > 0), the 
provision of lots with location amenities does not significantly change per-acre subdivision 
values.  The 73 subdivisions with lots adjoining water bodies other than storm water 
management ponds have an average 23 percent of their lots adjoining water.  These 
subdivisions have more floodplain and wetland than the other sample subdivisions (14.6 
percent of total acreage versus 5.3 percent), and they have less access to public sewer service 
(55 percent with access versus 76 percent of the other sample subdivisions).  Homeowners 
are sometimes thought to value access to water, but from a developer’s perspective, this 
preference is not translating into higher subdivision prices. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The main purpose of this study is to investigate whether a regulation governing the 
provision of forest on lands undergoing subdivision development affects developed land 
values.  The regulation is viewed as a policy that can cause a land developer to change the   28
configuration of building lots, constructed amenities and open space parcels that are supplied 
in a subdivision.  Accordingly, our hedonic price model is derived from a production model 
instead of a homebuyer bid rent model.  This hedonic model is consistent with a competitive 
market that is in equilibrium, and we interpret our results within that framework. Most of the 
estimated parameters are consistent with this viewpoint.  In particular, results for lot location 
amenities, constructed amenities, and provision of open space are robust across the models 
we have tried, and they provide support for the hypothesis that subdivision developers are 
mostly able to equate the values of mutable characteristics across subdivisions. 
Using data on properties undergoing subdivision in five Maryland counties and our 
hedonic models, we find that the Forest Conservation Act (FCA) is lowering the per-acre 
values of residential subdivisions by about 5.5 percent relative to exempt subdivisions.  The 
Act’s effect also effect depends on the type of subdivision that is constructed.  Our results 
suggest that the FCA planting requirements have had more of an effect on the developed land 
prices of subdivisions that contain a mix of single family and townhouse dwellings.  Per acre 
prices are not decreased for subdivisions containing a homogenous type of housing (all single 
family or all townhouse developments) beyond the general 5 to 6 percent decrease.  These 
findings hold regardless of whether developers meet the planting requirements by planting 
trees onsite or offsite.  We also find that giving developers the options to plant offsite or to 
pay fees in lieu of planting reduce the mixed-dwelling subdivision price decrease.  
Developers who pay fees have higher-priced subdivisions than developers who choose to 
plant trees. 
   Data used for the analysis were obtained for residential subdivisions with five or 
more building lots, which were approved for development in the six years after the FCA was   29
enacted.  Data limitations prevented us from including observations prior to the Act.  
Because of this, we are not able to evaluate how the Act may have affected the optimal 
timing of subdivision development.  We note that developers concerned about the 
regulations’ potential to reduce profits may have sought development plan approval before 
the Act’s provisions became mandatory.  Our finding that planting requirements have no 
differential effects on the price of single family or townhouse developments may result from 
landowners reacting to the FCA by changing the time at which properties are developed.  In 
equilibrium, timing of development should adjust to account for any value differences 
resulting from the enactment of the FCA, and that effect would be in our data. 
Maryland has been a strong advocate of ‘smart growth’ measures that seek to 
conserve rural lands, consolidate developed land uses, and encourage mixed-use 
development.  This study suggests that existing regulations may achieve some smart growth 
goals at the expense of others.  At least the FCA is found to retain or provide forest at some 
potential cost to the development of the mixed-use residential housing favored by some smart 
growth measures.  For the most part, however, developers appear to be able to alter the 
configuration of subdivisions to take account of buyers’ preferences for forestland, and to 
meet the Forest Conservation Act requirements without substantially lowering the per-acre 
value of the developed land.   30
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics for Variables developed for Study 
 
1 excludes areas in streets and parking lots     
2 excludes storm water management ponds
Variable 
Name 





ACRLNDVL  Average per-acre land value ($1,000 units)  261  242.014  359.250  701  1777 
AMENITY1  1 if walking paths, tot lots, sitting areas  261  0.169  0.375  0  1 
AMENITY2  1 if clubhouse or community center  261  0.015  0.123  0  1 
AMENITY3  1 if ball fields, tennis courts, swimming pool  261  0.057  0.233  0  1 
AMENITY4  1 if subdivision has a golf course  261  0.015  0.123  0  1 
ASSESSD97  1 if assessed in 1997  261  0.226  0.419  0  1 
ASSESD98  1 if assessed in 1998  261  0.360  0.481  0  1 
ASSESD00  1 if assessed in 2000  261  0.065  0.247  0  1 
BLDINSTR  Avg. predict. improvement value ($1,000/acre)  223  734.87  834.67  13.00  4456.33 
CARROLL  1 if subdivision in Carroll County  261  0.111  0.315  0  1 
CHARLES  1 if subdivision in Charles County  261  0.130  0.337  0  1 
CMMILE  Commuting miles to nearest CBD  261  23.2  17.4  5.0  92.9 
EXEMPT  1 if subdivision exempt from FCA  261  0.172  0.378  0  1 
FARMLAND  Percent of surrounding area in farmland  261  19.6  19.1  0  77.4 
HOWARD  1 if subdivision in Howard County  261  0.226  0.419  0  1 
LOTMIN  Minimum lot size in subdivision (acres)  261  0.727  1.032  0.021  9.550 
MINLOT  Minimum lot size in zoning code (acres)  261  2.135  4.385  0.021  25.000 
MONTGMRY  1 if subdivision in Montgomery County  261  0.249  0.433  0  1 
MSPAP_E  Elementary school MSPAP test score  261  49.43  16.20  14.13  80.77 
MSPAP_H  High school MSPAP test score  261  101.35  3.176  91.93  105.71 
NATURAL  Pct. adj. area bare or in forest, wetland, water  261  33.26  16.71  2.0  84.9 
OPENURBN  Pct. adj. area in parks, other public use  261  2.242  4.093  0  26.4 
OFFPLANT  Pct. acres forest planted offsite, including fee   261  3.191  9.652  0  95.6 
PCTFLDLT  Percentage of lots adjacent to floodplain   260  6.17  13.17  0  78.6 
PCTFORLT  Percentage of lots adjacent to forest  259  29.09  29.01  0  100.0 
PCTKEPT  Percentage of forest retained in subdivision  261  22.50  18.15  0  84.6 
PCTOPEN  Percentage of acres designated as open space  261  24.06  23.78  0  81.3 
PCTOPNLT
1  Percentage of lots adjacent to open space  261  37.63 32.88  0  100.0 
PCTSWMLT  Pct. of lots adj. to storm water mgmt. Pond  260  4.16  8.65  0  71.4 
PCTTREE  Pct. of acres in forest in undeveloped site  261  47.30  34.85  0  100.0 
PCTWATLT 
2  Percentage of lots adjacent to water body  260  6.47  14.76  0  83.3 
PCTWET  Percentage of acres in floodplain or wetland   260  7.92  13.24  0  88.2 
PLANT  Pct. Acres required to be planted to forest  261  7.81  11.23  0  95.6 
PLANTOFF  Pct. Acres of forest planted offsite  261  2.62  9.34  0  95.6 
PLANTON  Pct. Acres of forest planted onsite  261  4.62  7.28  0  37.3 
PRINCGEO  1 if subdivision in Prince Georges County  261  0.284  0.452  0  1 
TREEFEE  1 if fee paid in lieu of planting forest  261  0.065  0.247  0  1 
TYPE1  1 if subdivision has townhouses only  261  0.103  0.305  0  1 
TYPE2  1 if subdivision has single family houses only  261  0.828  0.378  0  1 
TYPE3  1 if sub. has single, town, multfmly dwellings  261  0.069  0.254  0  1 
VTAREA  Total acreage in subdivision development  261  39.86  57.52  1.0  367.7   32
Table 2:  Box-Cox Hedonic Price Models (Dependent Variable = ACRLNDVL) 
 
Model 1  Model 2   
Variable  Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Asymptotic 




t – Statistic 
Intercept  -4.6010 3.2240  -1.43  -4.6222 3.2442  -1.43 
ASSESD97  -0.01207 0.1573  -0.08 0.0002586  0.1577  0.00 
ASSESD99  0.07627 0.1358  0.56  0.08125 0.1363  0.60 
ASSESD00 0.4422  0.2493 1.77 0.4624  0.2536 1.82 
LOGAREA  -0.1547 0.07219  -2.14*  -0.1604 0.07291  -2.20* 
LOGMILE  -0.7580 0.1886  -4.02* -0.7603 0.1886  -4.03* 
NATURAL  -0.005898 0.004358  -1.35  -0.006004 0.004376  -1.37 
FARMLAND  -0.01865 0.006158  -3.03*  -0.01877 0.006167  -3.04* 
OPENURBN  0.02007  0.01547 1.30 0.02045  0.01551 1.32 
BLDINSTR  0.001480 0.0004173  3.55*  0.001478 0.0004165  3.55* 
LOTEXCPN  0.004908 0.01722  0.29  0.005787 0.01738  0.33 
LOTZONE  0.4963 0.1758  2.82*  0.4932 0.1756  2.81* 
MSPAP_E  0.01625 0.006717  2.42*  0.01597 0.006717  2.38* 
MSPAP_H  0.1346 0.03969  3.39*  0.1352 0.03987  3.39* 
PCTWET  0.006129 0.004920  1.25  0.005942 0.004916  1.21 
PCTTREE  -0.002543 0.002701  -0.94  -0.002610 0.002730  -0.96 
PCTKEPT  0.0007261 0.005468  0.13  0.0009511 0.005479  0.17 
LOTSIZE1  -11.6473 7.1339  -1.63  -11.7894 7.1814  -1.64 
LOTSIZE2  -0.3562  0.06802 -5.24* -0.03548  0.06791 -5.23* 
LOTSIZE3  5.9074 2.3992  2.46*  5.4237 2.3866  2.27* 
PCTOPN1  0.03495 0.01079  3.24*  0.03524 0.01086  3.25* 
PCTOPN2  0.004159 0.003478  1.20  0.004122 0.003492  1.18 
PCTOPN3  0.01263 0.008458  1.49  0.01465 0.008760  1.67 
AMENITY1  1.1579 0.2905  3.99*  1.1498 0.2888  3.98* 
AMENITY2  -0.3394 0.5031  -0.68  -0.2957 0.5045  -0.59 
AMENITY3  1.2161 0.3822  3.18*  1.1597 0.3781  3.07* 
AMENITY4  -0.1074 0.4901  -0.22  -0.1303 0.4911  -0.27 
PCTFLDLT  -0.001276 0.004408  -0.29  -0.001351 0.004410  -0.31 
PCTFORLT  -0.0009157 0.002287  -0.40  -0.0009735 0.002296  -0.42 
PCTOPNLT  -0.0003450  0.002257 -0.15  -0.00000886  0.002273 -0.00 
PCTWATLT -0.01432  0.004764 -3.01* -0.01441  0.004768 -3.02* 
PCTSWMLT  0.00007791  0.006279 0.01  0.0001869  0.006293 0.03 
PLANTH  0.002628  0.006955  0.38     
PLANT3  -0.09715  0.02936  -3.31*     
PLANTONH      0.002373  0.008988  0.26 
PLANTON3      -0.08148  0.03222  -2.53* 
OFFPLNTH      0.002311  0.008337  0.28 
OFFPLNT3      -0.1306  0.04740  -2.76* 
TREEFEE  0.5356 0.2288  2.34*  0.5802 0.2384  2.43* 
EXEMPT  0.4256 0.1715  2.48*  0.4268 0.1727  2.47* 
Transformation Parameters and Variances 
LAMBDA  0.1701 0.04283  3.97*  0.1707 0.04272  3.99* 
SIGMA-SQRD.  0.5454 0.2336  2.34*  0.5450 0.2329  2.34* 
      220  observations       220  observations 
      Log–likelihood  =  -245.5       Log–likelihood  =  -245.4 
   Restricted Log–likelihood = -1571.3         Restricted Log–likelihood = -1571.3 
   Adjusted Log–likelihood = -1135.7        Adjusted Log-likelihood = -1135.0 
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